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EMPLOYMENT LAW
Paul G. Beers*
This article focuses upon Virginia employment law between
spring 1995 and August 1996. Special topics, such as public
sector employment,' unemployment compensation and workers
compensation,2 lie outside the scope of this article, as do devel-
opments under federal statutes.
During the period covered by this article, tort actions by
employees alleging that their employers had dismissed or dis-
criminated against them in breach of public policy were the
most prevalent kind of employment law litigation in Virginia. A
* Member, Glenn, Feldmann, Darby & Goodlatte, Roanoke, Virginia. BA, 1980,
Trinity College; M.IA, 1983, Columbia University School of International Affairs;
J.D., 1986, Washington & Lee University School of Law.
1. While statutory public sector employment actions are not covered by this
article, the reader should note that a number of decisions in this area of the law
have appeared since 1995. See, e.g., Mandel v. Allen, 81 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding state employees were not entitled to due process protections prior to alter-
ation of their employment classifications and that they lacked a property right to
continued employment once governor eliminated their positions); Virginia Dept. of
Taxation v. Daughtry, 250 Va. 542, 463 S.E.2d 847 (1995) (upholding state agencies'
job transfers of employees whom grievance panels had reinstated to their employ-
ment); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. Cir. 509 (1995) (holding performance evalu-
ation was not arbitrary or capricious); Ransome v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. Cir. 507
(Richmond City 1995) (holding employee's complaint was not grievable); Henty v.
Leidinger, 36 Va. Cir. 407 (Fairfax County 1995) (holding sheriff was bound by griev-
ance panel's final ruling); In Re Appeal of Guardacosta, 36 Va. Cir. 308 (Rockinglhm
County 1995) (holding negative performance evaluation of state employee is grievable
only if employee demonstrates employer's appraisal was probably arbitrary or capri-
cious).
2. Easily the most important decision in the workers compensation realm during
the past year was Stenrich Group v. Jemmott, 251 Va. 186, 467 S.E.2d 795 (1996).
There, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a physical impairment resulting from
cumulative and gradually incurred trauma is not a compensable injury by accident
under the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65 2-100 to -1310
(Repl. VoL 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1996). Stenrich, 251 Va. at 199, 467 S.E.2d at 802.
For a discussion of the erosion of the Workers' Compensation Act exclusivity bar with
respect to intentional tort claims, see Paul G. Beers, Annual Survey of Virginia Law:
Employment Law, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1027, 1041-46 (1995).
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second area of significant activity included actions brought by
employers seeking to enforce non-competition covenants against
former employees. Both employers and employees registered
notable gains on these two fiercely contested fronts.
I. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN BREACH OF PUBLIC POLICY
During the time frame under consideration, Virginia employ-
ment law continued to be dominated by litigation concerning
the scope of a seminal opinion delivered by the Supreme Court
of Virginia more than one decade ago, Bowman v. State Bank of
Keysville.3 In Bowman, the Supreme Court of Virginia held
3. 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985). Bowman has been applied on numerous
occasions by federal and state courts. See, e.g., Ludwick v. Premier Bank North, No.
Civ. A. 95-189-A, 1996 WL 471167, (W.D. Va. July 29, 1996); Stafford v. Radford
Community Hosp., 908 F. Supp. 1369 (W.D. Va. 1995); Ecklund v. Fuisz Technology,
Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Va. 1995); Scearce v. Halifax County, No. Civ. A. 94-
0020-D (W.D. Va. May 26, 1995); Mannell v. American Tobacco Co., 871 F. Supp. 854
(E.D. Va. 1994); Weaver v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 805 F. Supp. 10 (W.D. Va. 1992);
Nicol v. Imagematrix, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Va. 1991); White v. Federal Ex-
press Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1536 (E.D. Va. 1990); Fielder v. Southco, Inc., 699 F. Supp.
577 (W.D. Va. 1988); Haigh v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America, 676 F. Supp. 1332
(E.D. Va. 1987); Clark v. Manheim Servs. Corp., 38 Va. Cir. 479 (Va. 1996) (per
curiam); Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 251 Va. 94, 465 S.E.2d 806
(1996); Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys. Corp., 247 Va. 98, 439 S.E.2d 328
(1994); Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 234 Va. 462, 362 S.E.2d 915 (1987); Allen v. Jenkins,
38 Va. Cir. 496 (Roanoke City 1996); Hoover v. Devine, 38 Va. Cir. 455 (Winchester
City 1996); Stalings v. Leeds, Inc., 37 Va. Cir. 469 (Martinsville City 1996); Litten v.
Smith, 37 Va. Cir. 467 (Fauquier County 1996); Wilson v. Continental Cablevision, 39
Va. Cir. 506 (Richmond City 1996); Bailey v. Scott Gallaher, Inc., 37 Va. Cir. 438
(Roanoke City 1995) (writ granted); Dowdy v. Bower, 37 Va. Cir. 432 (Roanoke City
1995); Smith v. Cinebar Prods., Inc., 37 Va. Cir. 428 (Newport News City 1995);
Jones v. Professional Hospitality Resources, Inc., 35 Va. Cir. 458 (Virginia Beach City
1995); Spencer v. Tultex Corp., 37 Va. Cir. 15 (Henry County 1995); Niland v. Town
of Middleburg, 36 Va. Cir. 48 (Loudoun County 1995); Ludwig v. T2 Medical, 34 Va.
Cir. 65 (Fairfax County 1994); Vaughn v. DynCorp, 38 Va. Cir. 516 (Fairfax County
1994); Shields v. PC-Expanders, Inc., 31 Va. Cir. 90 (Fairfax County 1993); Cauthorne
v. King, 30 Va. Cir. 202 (Richmond City 1993); Newman v. Medical Facilities of
America, 28 Va. Cir. 501 (Nelson County 1992); Pierce v. Foreign Mission Bd., 28 Va.
Cir. 168 (Richmond City 1992); Seay v. Grace Jefferson Home, 26 Va. Cir. 355 (Rich-
mond City 1992); Bussey v. Arlington Community Residences, Inc., 22 Va. Cir. 100
(Arlington County 1990); Millsap v. Synon, Inc., 19 Va. Cir. 261 (Fairfax County
1990); Roland v. Bon Air Cleaners, Inc., 19 Va. Cir. 184 (Richmond City 1990). Bow-
man claims are apparently available only to employees, and not to independent con-
tractors. See Derthick v. Bassett-Walker, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 510, 522 (W.D. Va. 1995);
Dulles Mutual Benefit Ass'n v. Air Transit, Inc., 15 Va. Cir. 140 (Loudoun County
1988).
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that at-will employees fired in violation of public policy can
bring a tort action for wrongful discharge against their former
employers.4 The Bowman plaintiffs were at-will employees of
the same bank in which they owned stock. The bank fired the
employees in retaliation for refusing to vote their shares in
favor of a proposed merger with another financial institution.
The Bowman Court declared that the bank had trampled upon
public policies impliedly enunciated in the Virginia Stock Corpo-
ration Act when it discharged the employees.5 This statutory
scheme is founded on the basic, if implicit, right of stockholders
to vote their shares without interference or intimidation from
corporate management.6 Despite their at-will status, the Bow-
man plaintiffs had a cause of action in tort because the bank
had discharged them for exercising this implied right.' As re-
stated two years later in Miller v. SEVAMP,8 a Bowman claim
exists to redress "discharges which violate public policy, that is,
the policy underlying existing laws designed to protect the prop-
erty rights, personal freedoms, health, safety or welfare of the
people in general."9
The Bowman plaintiffs were fired in violation of a public
policy that was implied rather than explicit."° Case law devel-
opments during the period under consideration suggest that
Bowman claims likely will fail unless plaintiffs can prove that
they were fired for either exercising an express statutory right
or discharging an explicit statutory duty. This narrowing of
Bowman was evident in Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v.
4. Bowman, 229 Va. at 540, 331 S.E.2d at 801.
5. Id. at 540, 331 S.E.2d at 801; see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1 to -200 (Repl. Vol.
1993). The Virginia Stock Corporation Act was subsequently repealed and recodified
at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-601 to -780 (Repl. VoL 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
6. Bowman, 229 Va. at 540, 331 S.E.2d at 801.
7. Id.
8. 234 Va. 462, 362 S.E.2d 915 (1987).
9. Id- at 465, 362 S.E.2d at 918. No cause of action exists under Bowman to
redress discharges which violate private, nonstatutory rights or policies. See, e.g.,
Derthick v. Bassett-Walker, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 510, 522 (W.D. Va. 1995).
10. Bowman, 229 Va. at 540, 331 S.E.2d at 801 ("Code § 13.1-32 conferred on
these plaintiffs as stockholders the right to one vote .... This statutory provision
contemplates that the right to vote shall be exercised free of duress and intimidation
imposed on individual stockholders by corporate management.") (emphasis added). The
statute in question does not expressly declare that firing a shareholder-employee in
retaliation for her exercise of the corporate franchise violated Virginia's public policy.
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-662 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
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Brooks," a decision handed down by the Supreme Court of
Virginia in 1996. Otis Brooks was a body shop repairman for
Lawrence Chrysler. Brooks' superior instructed him to repair a
damaged vehicle in a shoddy and unsafe manner. Lawrence
Chrysler fired Brooks because he refused to fix the car in accor-
dance with this unsafe method.' Brooks then sued Lawrence
Chrysler for wrongful discharge in breach of public policy.'
The car dealership appealed a jury verdict in Brooks' favor.'4
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed this award and en-
tered judgment for the employer.'5 Although Brooks cited Vir-
ginia automobile salvage statutes, 6 none of these expressly de-
clared that firing employees for refusing to repair wrecked
vehicles in an unsafe manner violates public policy.'7 The su-
preme court rejected Brooks' argument that a plaintiff may
proceed under Bowman even in the absence of an express stat-
utory enunciation of public policy. 8 "Brooks contends that even
though he is an employee at-will, Lawrence Chrysler wrongfully
discharged him in violation of Virginia's public policy and that
'the public policy of Virginia need not be found in an express
statutory command.' We disagree with Brooks."' Brooks' fail-
ure to specify the "precise statute that Lawrence Chrysler pur-
portedly contravened" proved fatal to his claim. 0
Even after Lawrence Chrysler, the most litigated subject in
Virginia employment law promises to remain Bowman's reach.
In particular, four issues, or clusters of issues, concerning the
scope of Bowman have been analyzed by state and federal
11. 251 Va. 94, 465 S.E.2d 806 (1996).
12. Id. at 96, 465 S.E.2d at 808.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 95, 465 S.E.2d at 807.
15. Id. at 99, 465 S.E.2d at 809.
16. Id. at 98, 465 S.E.2d at 809. The employee relied upon VA. CODE ANN. §§
46.2-1600 to -1610 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
17. 251 Va. at 98, 465 S.E.2d at 89; see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.2-1600 to -1610
(Repl. Vol. 1995).
18. Lawrence Chrysler, 251 Va. at 99, 465 S.E.2d at 809.
19. Id. at 96, 465 S.E.2d at 808.
20. Id. at 98, 465 S.E.2d at 809. For other recent examples of courts refusing to
recognize Bowman-Lockhart claims because the plaintiff failed to cite an explicit pub-
lic policy forbidding her discharge, see Ludwick v. Premier Bank North, 935 F. Supp.
801 (W.D. Va. 1996) and Childress v. City of Richmond, 907 F. Supp. 934, 942 (E.D.
Va. 1995).
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courts in the past year. The most controversial of these unset-
tled questions is whether a Bowman claim exists to redress
discriminatory discharges based on race, sex or other protected
status. In a 1994 decision, Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educa-
tional Systems Corp., ' the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that at-will employees terminated because of their race or gen-
der have common law causes of action for wrongful discharge in
breach of public policy under Bowman.' By a 4-3 decision, the
Lockhart Court reasoned that "the personal freedom to pursue
employment free of discrimination based on race or gender" was
even more important than a stockholder's right to vote her
shares without management interference.' In reaching this
conclusion, the supreme court quoted the Virginia Human
Rights Acte (the VHRA), which expressly declares that em-
ployment discrimination is against the public policy of Virgin-
iaY The majority emphasized that it was not establishing a
new cause of action directly under the VHRA Rather,
Lockhart represented an extension of Bowman to provide state-
law relief to employees discharged in violation of Virginia's pub-
lic policy against employment discrimination.
We recognize that the Virginia Human Rights Act does not
create any new causes of action. Code § 2.1-725. Here, we
do not rely upon the Virginia Human Rights Act to create
new causes of action. Rather, we rely solely on the narrow
exception that we recognized in 1985 in Bowman, decided
two years before the enactment of the Virginia Human
Rights ActY
The General Assembly responded to Lockhart in 1995 by
amending section 2.1-725 of the VHRAY8 Senate Bill No.
21. 247 Va. 98, 439 S.E.2d 328 (1994).
22. Id. at 104, 439 S.E.2d at 332.
23. Id., 439 S.E.2d at 331.
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-714 to -725 (Repl. Vol. 1987); see VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-
714 to -725 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
25. Lockhart, 247 Va. at 105, 439 S.E.2d at 331 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-715
(Repl. Vol 1987)).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. S.B. 1025, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1995) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
2.1-725 (Repl. Vol. 1995)).
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1025,29 which became effective on July 1, 1995, was an awk-
ward bid to eliminate Lockhart by legislators who were con-
vinced that the decision left Virginia businesses unduly exposed
to liability for employment discrimination. The amended VHRA
actually creates an extremely weak, statutory cause of action
for discriminatory discharge. This limited right of action is
available only against firms that have more than five, but less
than fifteen employees. ° Employers of other sizes who discrim-
inate are arguably insulated altogether from state law liability
as a result of the 1995 VHRA amendments. Thus, the amend-
ments provide that "Ic]auses of action based upon the public
policies reflected in this chapter shall be exclusively limited to
those actions, procedures and remedies, if any, afforded by
applicable federal or state civil rights statutes or local
ordinances.""' Apparently, the purpose of this language is to
replace the viable, nonstatutory cause of action for discriminato-
ry discharge recognized in Lockhart with the ineffectual, statu-
tory cause of action set up by the legislature.
Whether the 1995 amendments to the VHRA have eliminated
or even tempered Lockhart is a critical question. Four trial
courts since August 1995 have held or strongly suggested that
Lockhart survives the 1995 VHRA amendments unscathed.32
29. Id.
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-725(B) (Repl. Vol. 1995). Under the amended statute,
recoverable damages are limited to "up to twelve months' back pay," along with inter-
est. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-725(c). Front pay and compensation for emotional injuries
are disallowed, as are punitive damages and reinstatement. Id.
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-725(D) (Repl. Vol. 1995). The anti-Lockhart amendments
almost certainly do not affect Lockhart claims filed prior to July 1, 1995. See, e.g.,
Wilson v. Continental Cablevision, 39 Va. Cir. 506 (Richmond City 1996); Allen v.
Jenkins, 38 Va. Cir. 496, 499 (Roanoke City 1996); Litten v. Smith, 37 Va. Cir. 467
(Fauquier County 1996); Dowdy v. Bower, 37 Va. Cir. 432, 435 (Roanoke City 1995);
Easely v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 36 Va. Cir. 296 (Roanoke City 1995).
32. Roberts v. Wal-Mart, No. CIV. A. 95-0059-H, 1996 WL 403790 (W.D. Va. July
1, 1996); Ecklund v. Fuisz Technology, Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Va. 1995); Lundy
v. Cole Vision Corp., 39 Va. Cir. 254 (Va. Cir. Richmond City, 1996); Holmes v.
Tiedeken, 36 Va. Cir. 491 (Richmond City 1995). Other decisions underscore the avail-
ability of statutes beside the VHRA on which to base a Bowman-Lockhart claim for
discriminatory discharge. Thus, in Wilson v. Continental Cablevision, 39 Va. Cir. 506
(Richmond City 1996), the circuit court thundered, "It is the opinion of this court that
the Virginia Human Rights Act, both before and after the 1995 amendments, was in-
tended to prevent common law tort actions for wrongful termination based on viola-
tions of public policy." Id. at 512. Despite this refusal to allow Lockhart claims in the
aftermath of the 1995 amendments, Wilson is an important triumph for employees.
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These courts have concentrated on the Lockhart majority's dec-
laration that its recognition of a common law action for discrim-
inatory discharge did not rest on the VHRA. The Supreme
Court of Virginia might well embrace this reading of Lockhart.
Significantly, the Lockhart Court rejected the employer's argu-
ment that the pre-amendment version of Virginia Code section
2.1-725(D), quoted below, nullified the VHRA as a source of
public policy on which to base a Bowman claim.3
Nothing in this chapter creates, nor shall it be construed to
create, an independent or private cause of action to enforce
its provisions. Nor shall the policies or provisions of this
chapter be construed to allow tort actions to be instituted
instead of or in addition to the current statutory actions for
unlawful discrimination.'
Despite this pre-amendment provision, the Lockhart Court held
that a common law action exists for discriminatory discharge
under Bowman.35
The 1995 amendments restated and re-emphasized that the
VHRA does not create any cause of action other than the one
specified in the statute." The amendments, however, did not
overrule Lockhart. This is the approach taken by the United
The circuit court proceeded to find that the plaintiffs had stated a claim for discrimi-
natory discharge under the Virginia Fair Employment Contracting Act, which pro-
vides, "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia to
eliminate all discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
from the employment practices of the Commonwealth, its agencies, and government
contractors." VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-374 (RepL VoL 1995). Because the defendant in
Wilson, like many employers, was a government contractor, the plaintiffs had stated a
cause of action for discriminatory discharge, even aside from the VHRA. Wilson, 39
Va. Cir. at 506. In addition to this statutory expression of public policy, the plaintiffs
also relied on anti-discrimination policies found in City of Richmond ordinances that
applied to the defendant cable television company as a franchisee of the municipality.
Id. at 512-13. The circuit court held that these local ordinances provided an indepen-
dent source of public policy on which to base a discriminatory discharge claim. Id. at
513. For another example of a court upholding an action for discriminatory discharge
based on local ordinances and Virginia statutes other than the VHRA, see Harris v.
City of Virginia Beach, 923 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Va. 1996).
33. Lockhart, 247 Va. at 105, 439 S.E.2d at 331.
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-725 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
35. Lockhart, 247 Va. at 106, 439 S.E.2d at 331.
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-725 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cur. Supp. 1996).
1996] 1379
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States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in
Ecklund v. Fuisz Technology, Ltd."
Although the Virginia Legislature may have recently tried
to overrule Lockhart by stating that causes of action to
enforce the public policies reflected in the Virginia Human
Rights Act are exclusively limited to those provided by
statute, the new statute merely restates the original statute
using slightly different language. The Virginia Supreme
Court carefully avoided the restrictions in the old statute in
relying instead on its own precedent in Bowman. Because
Bowman predates [the VHRA], this line of cases is clearly
unaffected by the revised statute.38
The type of discriminatory discharge that may be the basis of
a Lockhart claim also has been a subject of considerable litiga-
37. 905 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Va. 1995).
38. Id. at 340. This profoundly sensitive issue is about more than statutory con-
struction. To hold that no cause of action exists under Virginia law for race discrimi-
nation in employment comes close to holding that race discrimination once again is
public policy in Virginia. Courts in 1996 were understandably reluctant to suggest
that shareholder-employees such as the Bowman plaintiffs have a cause of action for
wrongful discharge, but African-Americans fired on account of their race are left
stranded outside the courthouse by the anti-Lockhart amendments to the VHRA. See
Holmes v. Tiedeken, 36 Va. Cir. 491, 492 (Richmond City 1995) (holding that
Lockhart survived the 1995 amendments to the VHRA because race and gender dis-
crimination is incompatible with Virginia's public policy and "[tihis court refuses to
entertain the notion that the General Assembly, through statute, legislative history,
or otherwise, has done anything at all to even remotely suggest that it would alter
that public policy.").
Several decades ago the public policy of Virginia clearly was to discriminate
against African-Americans. Even the most "progressive" Virginians were committed to
keeping African-Americans physically segregated and politically irrelevant. Thus Gov-
ernor Harry F. Byrd, who as United States Senator led the infamous "massive resis-
tance" campaign against school desegregation in the 1950s, warned the Virginia State
Bar at its 1927 convention that the poll tax and other restrictions on the African-
American franchise were essential to preventing a reemergence of "the terrible condi-
tion which existed in reconstruction days in Virginia when negroes sat side by side in
the State Capitol in Richmond with the very flower of white manhood of the State."
Governor Harry F. Byrd, Address to the Virginia State Bar Association (Aug. 3, 1927)
(available in Papers of Harry F. Byrd, Alderman Library, University of Virginia). On
Virginia's twentieth century Jim Crow statutes and public policies, see SAMUEL N.
PiNcus, THE ViRGnqIA SUPREME COURT, BLAcKS AND THE LAw, 1870-1902 (1990);
RAYMOND H. PULLEY, OLD VIRGINIA RESTORED, AN INTERPRETATION OF THE PROGRES-
SIVE IMPULSE, 1870-1930 (1968); Richard B. Sherman, The "Teachings at Hampton
Institute," Social Equality, Racial Integrity and the Virginia Public Assemblage Act of
1926, VA. MAG. HIsT. & BIOGRAPHY, July 1987, at 275; Charles E. Wynes, The Evolu-
tion of Jim Crow Laws in Twentieth Century Virginia, 28 PHYLON 416 (1967).
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tion since 1995. For example, the VHRA declares that employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of age and disability, -as well
as race and gender, violates public policy.39 Nevertheless, sev-
eral state and federal trial courts recently have held that no
cause of action exists under Bowman-Lockhart to redress age or
disability discrimination.4" In Clark v. Manheim Services
Corp.,4 the plaintiff sued his former employer in the Circuit
Court of Rockingham County for wrongful discharge in breach
of public policy. The plaintiff alleged that in firing him the
employer had engaged in age discrimination. The circuit court
sustained the employer's demurrer on the grounds that age
discrimination is not actionable under Bowman-Lockhart. In
a terse, unpublished order, the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled
that the circuit court had erred as a matter of law and remand-
ed the case for trial.'
The unpublished, per curiam order in Clark all but establish-
es that the Supreme Court of Virginia is prepared to uphold
age discrimination claims under Lockhart. Whether a corre-
sponding action is available for victims of disability discrimina-
tion remains less clear. At least three trial courts have held
that an employee fired because of her disability lacks a right of
action under Bowman-Lockhart.' In Stafford v. Radford Com-
munity Hospital, Inc.,' for instance, the plaintiff alleged that
she was discharged because of her disability in violation of
federal statutes and Virginia's public policy as expressed in the
VHRA. The United States District Court for the Western Dis-
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-725 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
40. At least two courts have rejected any claim based on age discrimination.
Hunley v. First Union Nat'l Bank, CA No. 95-759-R (W.D. Va. Oct. 31, 1995);
Rasnick v. WAVY TV, Inc., CA No. 2:95cv686 (E.D. Va. Oct. 3, 1995). Other courts
have concluded that a Lockhart claim could be predicated on age discrimination. See
Stafford v. Radford Community Hosp., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1369, 1375 (W.D. Va. 1995);
Allen v. Jenkins, 38 Va. Cir. 496 (Roanoke City 1996). Several courts have held that
no Bowman-Lockhart claim exists for disability discrimination. Stafford, 908 F. Supp.
at 1375; Bradick v. Northrop-Grumman Corp., CA No. 95-640-A (E.D. Va. July 27,
1995); Mannell v. American Tobacco Co., 871 F. Supp. 854, 862, (E.D. Va. 1994). But
see Niland v. Town of Middleburg, 36 Va. Cir. 48, 53 (Loudoun County 1995) (recog-
nizing claim for disability discrimination).
41. 38 Va. Cir. 479 (Va. 1996) (per curiam).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See supra note 30.
45. 908 F. Supp. 1369 (W.D. Va. 1995).
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trict of Virginia granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment on this point.' In support of its decision, the district
court relied upon the exclusivity provision of the Virginians
with Disabilities Act ("VDA"), which states that "[tihe relief
available for violations of this chapter shall be limited to the
relief set forth in this section."' Pointing to this preemptive
language, the district court in Stafford held that the plaintiffs
"action for disability discrimination must be pursued under the
VDA and not as a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy."48
Decisions such as Stafford at least arguably contradict
Lockhart. The employers in Lockhart insisted that employees
fired on the basis of their race or gender should be limited to
the remedies available under existing federal discrimination
statutes,49 such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.5" Reject-
ing this defense, the Lockhart Court remarked that "[ilt is not
uncommon that injuries resulting from one set of operative
facts may give rise to several remedies, including common law
tort remedies as well as federal statutory remedies."
51
Whether a plaintiff may base a Bowman or Lockhart claim
on a federal statute is at the center of a third area of continu-
ing controversy. Last year in McBroom v. DynCorp, the Cir-
cuit Court for the County of Fairfax held that a plaintiff could
build a Bowman claim on the federal False Claims Act.' 'The
citizens of the Commonwealth of Virginia are citizens of the
United States, and any fraud perpetrated by a contractor on
the federal government violates no lesser public policy in Vir-
ginia than a fraud on the coffers of the government of the Com-
monwealth."' In contrast, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, in Childress v. City of Rich-
46. Id. at 1375.
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-46(C) (Repl. Vol. 1994); Stafford, 908 F. Supp. at 1375.
48. Stafford, 908 F. Supp. at 1375.
49. Lockhart, 247 Va. at 105, 439 S.E.2d at 332.
50. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
51. Lockhart, 247 Va. at 105, 439 S.E.2d at 332.
52. 38 Va. Cir. 109 (Fairfax County 1995).
53. 31 U.S.C. § 3729-3733 (1994). The plaintiff also relied on Virginia Code §
18.2-178. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.26-178 (Repl. Vol. 1996) (larceny by false pretens-
es).
54. McBroom, 38 Va. Cir. at 112.
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mond,55 declared that a Bowman-Lockhart claim must have as
its source a public policy "as embodied by state statutes, not
federal ones."5
6
Employers seeking to limit Bowman-Lockhart claims to those
grounded in state statutes can construct a solid argument that
this particular dispute was resolved in their favor by the Su-
preme Court of Virginia in Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp.
v. Brooks.' Because the plaintiff in that case attempted to
rely only on state statutes, the viability of federal law as a
source of public policy was not in question. Still, in rejecting
the plaintiffs claim, the Lawrence Chrysler Court used language
that suggests that the existence of a Virginia statute is an
essential element of this tort.
In Bowman and Lockhart, the plaintiffs, who were permit-
ted to pursue causes of action against their former employ-
ers, identified specific Virginia statutes in which the Gener-
al Assembly had established public policies that the former
employers had contravened. Unlike the plaintiffs in Bow-
man and Lockhart, Brooks does not have a cause of action
for wrongful discharge because he is unable to identify any
Virginia statute establishing a public policy that Lawrence
Chrysler violated."
The extent to which female employees may file Lockhart suits
for pregnancy discrimination is a fourth issue that continues to
divide trial courts. Circuit Courts for Henry County and the
City of Roanoke have held that because neither the VHRA nor
any other Virginia statute specifically prohibits pregnancy dis-
crimination, an employee fired on this basis has no Lockhart
55. 907 F. Supp. 934 (E.D. Va. 1995).
56. Id. at 941. Accord White v. Federal Express Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1536, 1550
(E.D. Va. 1990) (refusing to recognize a Bowman claim "based on the public policy
codified in Title VII"), affd, 939 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1991); Flinders v. Datasec Corp.,
742 F. Supp. 929, 935 (E.D. Va. 1990) (dictum) (observing that Bowman has "thus far
been correctly limited to public rights embodied in state statutes."); Bailey v. Scott
Gallaher, Inc., 37 Va. Cir. 438, 443 (Roanoke City 1995) (rejecting plaintiffs argument
that the Bowman exception to the at-will rule is "large enough to encompass the
entire corpus of Congressional enactments") (writ granted). But see Fielder v. Southco,
Inc., 699 F. Supp. 577, 578 (W.D. Va. 1988) (recognizing Bowman claim based on
Title VII as the source of Virginia's public policy against sex discrimination).
57. 251 Va. 94, 465 S.E.2d 806 (1996).
58. Id. at 98-99, 465 S.E.2d at 809 (emphasis added).
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claim.59 The Circuit Court of Newport News, however, conclud-
ed in a searching opinion that pregnancy discrimination is ac-
tionable under Lockhart because Virginia's public policy in favor
of protecting pregnant mothers and their fetuses is longstand-
ing.60 Curiously, none of these wide-ranging opinions addresses
section 2.1-716 of the VHRA, which provides: "Conduct which
violates any Virginia or federal statute or regulation governing
discrimination on the basis of... sex... shall be an 'unlaw-
ful discriminatory practice' for the purposes of this chapter."
Since 1978, Congress has explicitly included pregnancy discrimi-
nation in its definition of discrimination "on the basis of sex"
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.62 Employees, then, can
argue that by virtue of section 2.1-716 of the VHRA, pregnancy
discrimination is discrimination "on the basis of sex" and vio-
lates the Commonwealth's public policy, as well as federal law.
A lack of consensus similarly surrounds whether Lockhart
provides a remedy for sexual or racial harassment, as opposed
to sex discrimination. In Hairston v. Multi-Channel TV Cable
Co., 3 the plaintiff alleged that she had resigned due to her
supervisor's racial harassment. She sued the employer for
wrongful constructive discharge on a number of theories, includ-
ing breach of Virginia's public policy against racial harassment.
Hairston appealed the district court's dismissal of her claims."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court in an unpublished opinion.65 The
court of appeals held that a constructively discharged employee
lacks standing to bring a Lockhart action regardless of the level
of harassment which preceded the employee's resignation.66
59. Bailey v. Scott Gallaher, Inc., 37 Va. Cir. 438, 444 (Roanoke City 1995) (writ
granted); Spencer v. Tultex Corp., 37 Va. Cir. 15, 16 (Henry County 1995).
60. Smith v. Cinebar Prods., Inc., 37 Va. Cir. 428, 429 (Newport News City 1995).
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-716 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994) (defining "on the basis of sex" to include preg-
nancy discrimination for purposes of Title VII).
63. No. 95-2363, 1996 WL 119916 (4th Cir. Mar. 19, 1996).
64. Id. at *1.
65. Id. at *3.
66. Id. at *2 (observing that dismissal is appropriate because "no Virginia court
has expanded the Lockhart exception to a claim of constructive discharge"). This
statement by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is inaccurate.
See infra note 67. In the Title VII context, a sexually harassed employee may quit
and sue for constructive wrongful discharge if she satisfies a two part test: (1) her
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Lower courts have differed on whether employees can bring
Lockhart claims for sexual harassment, which frequently in-
volve a constructive discharge. At least five trial courts have
held that sexual harassment and constructive discharge claims
are cognizable under Lockhart." Other courts have taken the
position that a constructive discharge is not actionable under
Lockhart.6
A few courts appear to hold that no cause of action exists
even if the employer actually discharged the employee for refus-
ing to succumb to the harasser's demands. For example, in Hott
v. VDO Yazaki Corp.,69 the plaintiff was discharged because
she both refused to submit to her supervisor's requests for
sexual favors and subsequently complained to her employer
about the harassment.0 The United States District Court for
the Western District of Virginia rejected the plaintiffs request
"that this court expand the Lockhart court's recognition of the
working conditions must have been intolerable; and (2) the employer must have ei-
ther intended to force her to quit or subjected her to conditions that made her resig-
nation foreseeable. Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1350 (4th Cir.
1995).
67. Ecklund v. Fuisz Technology, Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335, 340-41 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(same-sex harassment); Hensler v. O'Sullivan Corp., C-. No. 94-0040-H (W.D. Va.
Oct. 31, 1995); Hoover v. Devine, 38 Va. Cir. 455, 458 (Winchester City 1996); Lundy
v. Cole Vision Corp., 39 Va. Cir. 254 (Richmond City 1996); Dowdy v. Bower, 37 Va.
Cir. 432, 437 (Roanoke City 1995).
Plaintiffs suing under Lockhart for sexual harassment frequently include a
separate count against their former employer for negligent retention or supervision of
the offending employee. Relying principally upon Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v.
Dowdy, 235 Va. 55, 61, 365 S.E.2d 751, 754 (1988), and Spencer v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
894 F.2d 651, 657 (4th Cir. 1990), several federal courts have held that Virginia does
not recognize a cause of action for negligent retention or supervision. Hott v. VDO
Yazaki Corp., 922 F. Supp. 1114, 1130 (W.D. Va. 1996); Dixon v. Denny's, Inc., No.
2:95cv901, slip op. at 9 (E.D. Va. July 29, 1996); Frye v. Virginia Transformer Corp.,
CIV. A. No. 95-0399-R, at *4 (W.D. Va. Nov. 29, 1995) (mem. order). The Circuit
Court of the City of Norfolk reached the opposite conclusion in Johnson-Kendricks v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 39 Va. Cir. 314, 319-20 (Norfolk City 1996).
68. Dixon v. Denny's, Inc., No. 2:95cv901 (E.D. Va. July 29, 1996) ("The Court
concludes as a matter of law that a claim for constructive discharge does not yet
exist under Virginia law."); Hott v. VDO Yazaki Corp., 922 F. Supp. 1114, 1129 (W.D.
Va. 1996); Stallings v. Leeds, Inc., 37 Va. Cir. 469, 470 (Martinsville City 1996);
Jones v. Professional Hospitality Resources, Inc., 35 Va. Cir. 458, 460-61 (Va. Beach
City 1995) ("It is only when the employer actually terminates the employee in vio-
lation of some established public policy that the narrow exception is applied."); Reed
v. Cardiology Assocs., No. 93-1481 (Va. Cir. Portsmouth City Nov. 8, 1994).
69. 922 F. Supp. 1114 (W.D. Va. 1996).
70. Id. at 1128.
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gender discrimination exception to encompass a claim of sexual
harassment."7 The Circuit Court of the City of Martinsville
reached the same conclusion in Stallings v. Leeds, Inc.7 '2 There,
the circuit court sketched a ponderous and antiquated distinc-
tion between discrimination on the basis of sex and harassment
on the basis of sex. "Allegations of sexual harassment do not
necessarily equate to sexual discrimination. Indeed, in some in-
stances the individual who claims sexual harassment may be
treated more favorably than others similarly situated." 3
II. COVENANTS AGAINST COMPETITION
Courts in Virginia issued a handful of significant decisions
concerning covenants against competition during the period
under review. Rash v. Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. of Rich-
mond 4 illustrates the far reaching protection employers may
receive against predatory former employees through the use of
broadly worded non-competition covenants. One of the defen-
dants in that case, Timothy Rash, was a former senior vice
president of Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Company of Richmond
("HRH"), which markets insurance plans.75 Mr. Rash's written
employment agreement contained the following covenant.
71. Id. at 1129.
72. 37 Va. Cir. 469 (Martinsville City 1996).
73. Id. at 469-70. Decisions such as Hott, 922 F. Supp. 1114, and Stallings, 37
Va. Cir. 469 are difficult to square with Lockhart and decades of civil rights jurispru-
dence. Wright v. Donnelly & Co., 28 Va. Cir. 185 (Loudoun County 1992), which was
consolidated on appeal with Lockhart, involved a claim by an employee who quit to
escape unrelenting sexual harassment and then sued her employer for constructive
discharge in breach of public policy. The Circuit Court of Loudoun County dismissed
this action on the grounds that an employee who resigns has no right of action under
Bowman. Wright, 28 Va. Cir. at 187. The Supreme Court of Virginia, in reversing the
circuit court, treated Wright's suit as a wrongful discharge action on appeal.
Lockhart, 247 Va. at 102, 439 S.E.2d at 330. Even apart from this implicit recogni-
tion by the Lockhart Court of a constructively discharged female's right to sue her
harasser, courts applying federal civil rights statutes have recognized that sexual ha-
rassment is an invidious form of sex discrimination. See, e.g. Meritor Says. Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) ("Without question, when a supervisor sexually
harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discrimi-
nate[s]' on the basis of sex.") (alteration in original).
74. 251 Va. 281, 467 S.E.2d 791 (1996).
75. Id. at 283, 467 S.E.2d at 793.
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[After termination, Mr. Rash] shall not directly or indirectly
as an owner, stockholder, director, employee, partner, agent,
broker, consultant or other participant, for a period of three
(3) years from the date of such termination:
(e) engage in any manner in any business competing
directly or indirectly with [HRH] 6
Mr. Rash's spouse worked in the same division as her hus-
band at HRH. Mrs. Rash, however, never executed a non-com-
petition covenant."
Both Rashes resigned from HRH on the same day. 8 With
financial assistance from her husband, Mrs. Rash immediately
established her own insurance firm and began competing for
HRH's existing clients. 9 In an attempt to stay within the con-
fines of his non-competition covenant, Mr. Rash did not sign or
place his name on any documents related to Mrs. Rash's compa-
ny." However, Mr. Rash allowed his wife to encumber the
couple's jointly held assets to facilitate financing for the enter-
prise.8
1
After Mrs. Rash convinced several of HRH's customers to
steer their business towards her new company, HRH sued to
enforce its non-competition covenant.82 Both Rashes and Mrs.
Rash's new company were named as defendants. The circuit
court found in HRH's favor and imposed a constructive trust
upon seventy-five percent of all commissions that the new firm
garnered from HRH's former accounts."
Finding Mr. Rash had breached his covenant by indirectly
engaging in a business that sought to lure away HRH's custom-
ers, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed." The supreme
court emphasized that Mr. Rash's agreement prohibited him
76. Id at 285, 467 S.E.2d at 794 (emphasis in original).
77. Id. at 284, 467 S.E.2d at 793.
78. Id.
79. I&
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 282, 467 S.E.2d at 792.
83. Id., 467 S.E.2d 793.
84. Id. at 286. 467 S.E.2d at 794.
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from being a "participant" or "engaging in any manner in any
business" that competed with HRH.8 Although Mr. Rash had
no formal affiliation with his wife's venture, his level of involve-
ment was sufficiently deep to render him a "participant" in the
new company's efforts to compete with HRH. Mr. Rash there-
fore had violated the covenant. 8 Additionally, the trial court
determined that the Rashes had engaged in a common law
conspiracy, a crucial determination that went unchallenged on
appeal.87 These findings supported the trial court's imposition
of a constructive trust on a large fraction of the commissions
that Ms. Rash's company earned from HRH's diverted custom-
ers.
88
The Rash Court's willingness to impose this constructive
trust was consistent with a series of decisions by the Supreme
Court of Virginia since 1993 providing relief to employers
preyed upon by employees and their co-conspirators who
impermissibly solicit clients or violate non-competition agree-
ments.8 9 Moreover, Rash suggests that employers should draft
covenants against competition broadly to thwart their circum-
vention by clever employees bent on rustling clients. Other
recent decisions, however, stand as reminders that covenants
which are too broad will fail altogether, leaving the employer
completely unprotected against employees turned competitors. 0
85. Id. at 285-86, 467 S.E.2d at 794.
86. Id. at 286, 467 S.E.2d at 794.
87. Id. at 287, 467 S.E.2d at 795.
88. Id. at 288, 467 S.E.2d at 795.
89. See, e.g., Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. v. DePew, 247 Va. 240, 248, 440 S.E.2d
918, 923 (1994) (enforcing non-competition covenant and finding employer had made
out prima facie case against employees for various claims, including breach of fiducia-
ry duty, conspiracy to interfere with contractual relations and tortious interference
with contract.); Catercorp, Inc. v. Catering Concepts, Inc., 246 Va. 22, 29, 431 S.E.2d
277, 281 (1993) (holding that employer's allegations framed viable claims against em-
ployees and third party for tortious interference with contract, conspiracy to induce
breach of contract and violation of duty of loyalty); New River Media Group, Inc. v.
Knighton, 245 Va. 367, 370, 429 S.E.2d 25, 27 (1993) (enforcing non-competition cove-
nant); see also Commercial Business Sys., Inc. v. Bellsouth Servs., Inc., 249 Va. 39,
47, 453 S.E.2d 261, 267 (1995).
90. The Supreme Court of Virginia applies a three-part balancing test in consider-
ing whether a non-competition covenant is valid and enforceable:
(1) Is the restraint, from the standpoint of the employer, reasonable in the
sense that it is no greater than is necessary to protect the employer in some legiti-
mate business interest?
(2) From the standpoint of the employee, is the restraint reasonable in the
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Thus, in Roto-Die Co., Inc. v. Lesser,"' the covenant prohibit-
ed David Lesser from becoming an "employee" of any "Competi-
tive Business" after his departure from Roto-Die Company,
Inc. 2 The United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Virginia declared this provision facially void on two
grounds. First, the covenant was not restricted to businesses
that actually competed with Lesser's former employer."3 In-
stead, it could be read to bar the employee from working for
any company that was a member of the same industry as Roto-
Die. To be enforceable, the district court reasoned, a covenant
must only restrict an employee's right to work for companies
which actually compete with the employer. 4 The second diffi-
culty with this covenant was its lack of a spatial boundary.95
The district court wrote: "Without an apparent limit in the lan-
guage of the covenants themselves, I can only conclude that the
covenants are meant to be world-wide in scope."96 Finding in-
sense that it is not unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing his legitimate efforts to
earn a livelihood?
(3) Is the restraint reasonable from the standpoint of a sound public policy?
New River Media, 245 Va. at 369, 429 S.E.2d at 26 (1993). Accord Blue Ridge Anes-
thesia and Critical Care, Inc. v. Gidick, 239 Va. 369, 371-72, 389 S.E.2d 467, 468-69
(1990); Paramount Termite Control, Inc. v. Rector, 238 Va. 171, 174, 380 S.E.2d 922,
924 (1989); Roanoke Eng'g Sales, Inc. v. Rosenbaum, 223 Va. 548, 552, 290 S.E.2d
882, 884 (1982); Richardson v. Paxton Co., 203 Va. 790, 794, 127 S.E.2d 113, 117
(1962); Meissel v. Finley, 198 Va. 577, 580, 95 S.E.2d 186, 188 (1956). In applying
this test, courts construe covenants strictly in favor of the employee and against -
enforcement by the employer. Clinch Valley Physicians, Inc. v. Garcia, 243 Va. 286,
289, 414 S.E.2d 599, 601 (1992); Linville v. Servisoft, Inc., 211 Va. 53, 55, 174 S.E.2d
785, 786-87 (1970); Richardson, 203 Va. at 795, 127 S.E.2d at 117.
91. 899 F. Supp. 1515 (W.D. Va. 1995). For another detailed opinion rejecting a
non-competition covenant for overbreadth, see Pais v. Automation Prods., Inc., 36 Va.
Cir. 230, 239 (Newport News City 1995).
92. Lesser, 899 F. Supp. at 1518.
93. Id. at 1520. The district court also noted that the covenant's enforceability
was questionable because it restricted Lesser from all forms of employment, even
positions that were unrelated to the work that he performed for Rota-Die. Id.
94. Id; see Grant v. Carotek, Inc., 737 F.2d 410, 412 (4th Cir. 1984); Richardson
v. Paxton Co., 203 Va. 790, 795, 127 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1962). But see Roanoke Eng'g
Sales Co. v. Rosenbaum, 223 Va. 548, 553, 290 S.E.2d 882, 885 (1982) (prohibition
against participation by former executive in "activities similar to the type of business
conducted" by employer held reasonable).
95. Lesser, 899 F. Supp. at 1521.
96. Id. Courts in Virginia have on several occasions refused to enforce covenants
that lacked a geographical limit. E.g., Alston Studios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Gress &
Assocs., 492 F.2d 279, 284 (4th Cir. 1974); Power Distribution, Inc. v. Emergency
Power Eng'g, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 54, 57-58 (E.D. Va. 1983); Davis-Robertson Agency v.
Duke, 119 F. Supp. 931, 935-36 (E.D. Va. 1953).
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sufficient evidence that the employer was competing in world-
wide markets, the district court declared the covenant void for
overbreadth." The district court ruled that the presence of a
standard provision in which Lesser acknowledged that the cove-
nants were reasonable and enforceable was irrelevant.9 8 Vir-
ginia law requires that non-competition covenants be reasonable
restraints on trade, considering the interests of the employer,
the employee and the public.99 "Employers," Judge Kiser ex-
plained, "may not circumvent this public policy merely by in-
cluding boilerplate language in their employment agree-
ments.""' Finally, the district court refused to edit, or "blue-
pencil," the overbroad covenant to render it enforceable.'' Af-
ter surveying the sparse precedent on this point, Judge Kiser
concluded that courts applying Virginia law are not free to
salvage offensive covenants by "blue-pencilling" them."°
Lesser reads like a primer on the hurdles drafters confront in
constructing protective covenants that can withstand courtroom
challenges to the reasonableness of their functional and geo-
graphic scope. But even the most well-balanced covenant will
fail if the employer lacks standing to enforce it. In Reynolds &
Reynolds Co. v. Hardee,' a case of first impression in Virgin-
ia, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia held that non-competition covenants are not assignable
from one employer to another without the employee's
97. Lesser, 899 F. Supp. at 1521.
98. Id. at 1519.
99. See supra note 90.
100. Lesser, 899 F. Supp. at 1519-20.
101. Id. at 1523. While the district court struck the two overbroad, non-competition
articles, it left intact other parts of the agreement which prohibited disclosure of con-
fidential information and solicitation of Roto-Die's employees. Id. at 1522. These two
prohibitions were severable and enforceable because they addressed legitimate con-
cerns distinct from the non-competition covenants. Id.
102. Id. at 1523. Unlike some states, Virginia probably prohibits blue-pencilling.
See Clinch Valley Physicians, Inc. v. Garcia, 243 Va. 286, 289, 414 S.E.2d 599, 601
(1992). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has long main-
tained that Virginia law forbids a court from revising a non-competition covenant to
render it reasonable. Alston Studios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Gress & Assocs., 492 F.2d 279,
284 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding that "the restrictive covenant must be judged as a whole
and must stand or fall when so judged" (quoting Welcome Wagon, Inc. v. Morris, 224
F.2d 693, 701 (4th Cir. 1955))).
103. 932 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. Va. 1996).
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consent."°4 The Reynolds and Reynolds Company ("Reynolds")
purchased the goodwill and assets of Jordan Graphics, Inc.
("Jordan"). Included in the sale was an Employment Agreement
between Jordan and Thomas Hardee, a sales representative."5
Jordan dismissed Hardee on the day of the sale to
Reynolds.' 6 Hardee offered to work for Reynolds under the
same terms as those found in his Employment Agreement with
Jordan. Reynolds, however, refused to hire Hardee unless he
would execute a substantially more restrictive non-competition
covenant than the one found in his Employment Agreement
with Jordan."' Two months later Reynolds filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
against Hardee for competing against Reynolds in alleged viola-
tion of his non-competition covenant.0"
The question presented by Hardee's motion to dismiss
Reynolds' suit for lack of standing was "whether covenants not
to compete contained in employment contracts are assign-
able."'" Relying primarily upon Vermont case law, Judge
Smith held that Reynolds lacked standing because the covenant
not to compete contained in Hardee's Employment Agreement
with Jordan could not be assigned without the employee's con-
sent." The district court observed that, as a personal services
contract, Hardee's Employment Agreement with Jordan was,
"without question," not subject to unilateral assignment under
traditional principles of Virginia law."' The covenant against
competition was part of that unassignable personal services
contract. The court opined: "Dividing defendant's contract and
allowing portions of it to be assigned, while disallowing assign-
104. Id. at 156.
105. Id. at 151.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 151-52.
109. Id. at 153.
110. Id. at 155; see Smith, Bell & Hauck, Inc. v. Cullins, 183 A-2d 528, 532
(1962). Other courts have reasoned that assigning a non-competition covenant does
not run afoul of the traditional rule against assignment of personal services contracts.
See, e.g., In Re Hearing Ctrs. of America, Inc., 106 B.R. 719, 722 (M.D. Fla. 1989)
(holding that covenants not to compete are assignable because they attempt to prohib-
it performance of personal services "rather than attempt to assign the performance of
a personal service").
111. Reynolds, 932 F. Supp. at 155.
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ment of the whole is inconsistent with this Virginia
precedent.""
III. CONCLUSION
Suits by employees alleging that their employers sacked them
in tortious breach of public policy and equity actions by em-
ployers seeking enforcement of non-competition covenants
against former employees have been the most active forms of
employment law litigation in Virginia since the spring of 1995.
Both employers and employees can cite limited victories on
these battlegrounds. Trumpeting Lawrence Chrysler especially,
employers can argue in the broadest terms that courts have
demonstrated heightened circumspection about the types of
statutes that will support a Bowman-Lockhart claim. Employ-
ees, however, should be at least as encouraged by the unwill-
ingness of trial courts thus far to rule that the 1995 anti-
Lockhart amendments to the Virginia Human Rights Act doom
actions for discriminatory discharge in state court.
The decision by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Rash is
another in a streak of important triumphs for employers over
the past three years in actions against disloyal or predatory
employees. As a result of Rash, Virginia employers likely will
become more aggressive about pursuing a former employee who
sidesteps a non-competition covenant to participate even infor-
mally in a newly formed, rival venture. At the same time, re-
cent federal district court decisions illustrate that employees
seeking to evade the strictures of a non-competition covenant
stand a reasonable chance of success if the agreement is even
arguably overbroad or otherwise contrary to public policy.
112. Id.
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